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Self-Defense:  Tell Me Moore 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan* 
Michael Moore is a master architect in criminal law theory.  Each piece of his theorizing neatly 
and completely coheres with others.  Moore’s views are often so clear and well argued that if one 
spends enough time with Moore’s work, one can generally predict his answers to any question.   Every 
brick has its place.  And there’s more.  Moore also has a thoroughly worked out shtick for explaining his 
theories.  Moore’s writings are replete with citations to movies, songs, and even Sunday comics, 
including The Princess Bride,1 Blondie,2 and The Sound of Music.3  Indeed, sometimes it seems that 
reading Moore’s work is an exercise in bad popular culture references. 
One of the most predictable of Moore’s references is when he needs to talk about self-defense.  
In the movie, History of the World Part I, Moses drops one of the tablets, leaving ten instead of fifteen 
commandments.  That third tablet, argues Moore, included exceptions to deontological norms such as 
the exception for self-defense.4  It’s Moore’s clever way of asserting that even deontology does not 
really mean “thou shalt not kill” full stop.   
Like Moses’ third tablet, Moore’s work likewise seems to have dropped self-defense.  It is almost 
an afterthought in his theorizing about the relationship between deontology and consequentialism.  
Placing Blame contains a handful of pages.5  Self-defense gets two pages in Causation and 
Responsibility.6  Even when he discusses targeted killings in Targeted Killings and the Morality of Hard 
Choices, Moore quickly moves beyond a self-defense justification.7 
Self-defense fascinates me, and I have questions for Moore.  I just wish that he would say more 
about the positions that he holds.  More troubling, I worry that the sparse commitments he has may be 
difficult to square with some of his other criminal law positions.  Putting the pieces together of that 
broken tablet may ultimately yield that Moore’s architecture is left askew.   
In what follows, I will first give a brief overview of the current theorizing about self-defense.  
Next, I will set forth Moore’s arguments about when self-defense is justified and why.  Finally, I will raise 
* For comments on this manuscript, I thank Stephen Morse.
1 For dismissing the distinction between being “almost dead” and “all dead.” Moore, 2009d, 66.
2 For the point that between causation and accomplice liability, the criminal law is gonna get you “one way or
another.”  Moore, 2009d, 289.
3 To do the work essential to Moore’s view on omissions that “nothing comes from nothing.”  Moore, 2009d, 54-
55.
4 Despite having heard Moore make this reference at several conferences, I could not find an instance in which he
used it in his writing.  He alludes to it in Moore, 2012b, 449.
5 Moore, 1997b, 711-717.




a series of questions, both about the content of Moore’s view and its implications for other positions he 
holds. 
I. Self-Defense Theorizing:  The State of the Art in a Nutshell
When one endeavors to give an account of “self-defense,” the initial question is what one 
means by “self-defense.”  As a matter of ordinary language, our use of the term is quite extensive.  If a 
culpable aggressor tries to kill me and I kill him, I will justify my action by claiming “self-defense.”  The 
term can also be applied to the killing of an innocent aggressor, that is, a person who lacks culpability 
but whose act will kill me, such as a child who mistakenly believes a real gun to be a toy.  And, we can 
certainly say that one acts in self-defense when one kills an innocent threat, an individual who does not 
even voluntarily act but whose body nevertheless threatens me, such as the large man who will fall on 
me and kill me if I do not disintegrate him immediately.8  Indeed, “self-defense” would likewise be an 
explanation for why I shot a rabid dog that was about to attack me or maybe even why I disintegrated 
your television set that was about to smash into me during a tornado.   
Given that all instances of self-defense are “defensive” in nature, it is tempting to think that 
there must be a unifying explanation.  I think we ought to resist that temptation.  Because we can 
meaningfully employ the term “self-defense” to justify our killing of a culpable aggressor or destroying a 
neighbor’s television, the explanation would likely have to be so broad as to run roughshod over 
relevant moral nuances.   It is thus more fruitful to think of self-defense as a type of defense, where 
some tokens may be permissible (or justified) and others will not. 9     
One of the most important normative and conceptual moves in the self-defense literature in the 
last decade or so has been to carve out liability as a distinct route to permissibility.10  Previously, it 
seemed that one must opt to either take an “aggressor-centered” approach or a “defender-centered” 
perspective.  The assumption was that we needed to pick which approach should govern self-defense.  
However, this assumption is false.  One may believe that both perspectives are morally relevant.  A 
liability approach focuses on what an aggressor must do to be liable to defensive force, that is, to have 
forfeited his right against being defensively harmed.  A permission-based view focuses on when a 
defender may harm a person who is, or is perceived to be, an attacker.  It is coherent to say that an 
individual is liable to be killed but it is impermissible for the defender to do so, and it is also coherent to 
claim that an agent may permissibly kill someone who is not liable to be killed.   
As one brief example of this severance, consider the well-known trolley problem.  It is generally 
assumed that one may turn the runaway trolley away from five trapped workers to one trapped worker.  
Many theorists maintain that the one worker’s rights will be infringed, but not violated, because the 
8 These cases were originally imagined by Robert Nozick.  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: 
Basic Books, 1974), 34-35.   
9 As suggested by Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford, 2005), 117; Jeff McMahan, “Self-Defense 
and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker,” 104 Ethics 252 (1994), 256. 
10 This suggestion seems to originate in McMahan, “Innocent Attacker.”  McMahan has continually distinguished 
these concepts in his work.  It was made quite explicit by Helen Frowe, “A Practical Account of Self-Defence,” 29 




action is justified.  Notably, the worker has certainly done nothing to lose his right to life.  The worker is 
not liable to be killed.  Contrast this with a culpable aggressor where we would say that the attacker’s 
rights are neither infringed nor violated.  His own actions have forfeited his moral complaint against 
being killed defensively.   
Allowing liability to serve as a route to permissibility opens up various possibilities.  For instance, 
one may maintain that (1) the moral basis for liability to defensive killing is intending a culpable attack 
or so appearing; (2) a moral permission to kill another may be based on the agent-relative permission to 
give one’s life greater weight; and that (3) as a matter of the usage of the term, “self-defense,” it may be 
appropriate to call actions under either (1) or (2) (or both), instances of “self-defense.”  This means that 
not only do you get to kill bad guys who are trying to kill you for the reason that they have forfeited 
their rights but you also get to kill an innocent aggressor (at least sometimes) because you are entitled 
to give your life more weight. 
To this point we have seen that the term “self-defense” is quite promiscuous and that different 
justifications may ground different routes to permissible self-defense.  Let us now turn directly to 
liability accounts.  Liability accounts hold that what the aggressor does grounds why he has forfeited his 
rights against defensive force being employed to stop him.  Elsewhere, I have defended the following 
disjunctive conditions for liability to defensive killing:11 
(1a) The aggressor forms an intention to purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly kill the 
defender, the aggressor lacks a justification or excuse, and the aggressor will kill the defender 
unless defensive force is used, or 
(1b)   The aggressor purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly engages in conduct that he is aware 
may lead the defender to believe that that (1a) is true, and the aggressor lacks a justification or 
excuse for so doing; AND 
(2) Based on his belief that he is subject to attack, the defender acts to repel the perceived 
attack.   
That is, I argue that culpable attackers who will kill their victims are liable to defensive force by the 
defender.  I have defended the position that this (1a) forfeiture is a fitting and appropriate response to a 
culpable attack by the aggressor.  If the aggressor were permitted to attack, thus ignoring the rights of 
others while maintaining his own rights, it would be fundamentally unfair.12  The grounding of the 
forfeiture for (1b) is distinct.  For this sort of forfeiture, I maintain that when we insincerely evince the 
exercise of a normative power or a change in normative relations, that power is exercised or those 
relations are truly altered, or so I have argued.13  This forfeiture by insincere act is fitting and 
appropriate because the faker would otherwise make the interpreter normatively vulnerable. The 
                                                          
11 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Culpable Aggression:  The Basis for Moral Liability to Defensive Killing,” 9 Ohio St. J. 
Crim. L. 669 (2012). 
12 Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Forfeiture and Self-Defense” in Michael Weber and Christian Coons (eds.), The Ethics 
of Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford, forthcoming).  




interpreter no longer knows what rights and duties he has.  The idea is that if someone points an 
unloaded gun at you but makes you believe the gun is loaded, you mistakenly believe that he has 
forfeited his rights.  Because he is the one who has culpably created this belief, he forfeits his rights such 
that he is not wronged by your using the force you believe is necessary to defend yourself. 
Other self-defense theorists offer disparate views.  To take two other views in the literature, Jeff 
McMahan grounds forfeiture in moral responsibility, which is best understood as unjustified, 
foreseeable risk imposition.14  Jonathan Quong grounds forfeiture in the failure to attribute to someone 
his full moral status.15  We can contrast the claims by considering the following three cases.   
Falling Large Man.16  Victor falls to the bottom of a well.  His arch-enemy, Abe, sees this.  When 
Tony, a very large man, walks by, Abe pushes Tony down the well.  If Tony lands on Victor, Victor 
will die but Tony will live.  Victor has in his possession a ray gun with which he can disintegrate 
Tony.   
Conscientious Driver.17  Darla is driving her well maintained car down the road.  Suddenly, her 
car malfunctions such that it veers toward Peter, a pedestrian.  If Darla hits Peter, he will die.  
Peter can throw a grenade at Darla’s car such that it will blow up and kill only her. 
The Resident.18  An identical twin of a vicious killer is driving down the road when his car 
malfunctions.  He is nonculpably unaware of the fact that his brother has escaped from prison 
and local news channels have warned residents to be on the lookout.  Moreover, his evil twin 
has a modus operandi of knocking on the door to a home and then immediately killing the 
occupant.  The innocent twin knocks on the Resident’s door.  She believes he is his evil twin 
brother; she raises her pistol to shoot him (that she just happens to be holding).  The innocent 
twin sees what the Resident is about to do.  (To be clear, in The Resident, the question is 
whether the Resident is liable to be killed because she mistakenly believes the innocent twin to 
be the evil one and acts on that mistaken belief.) 
 Falling Large Man is commonly viewed as an instance of an innocent threat because the fact 
that he is threatening Victor with harm is not attributable to a voluntary act.19  Conscientious Driver and 
The Resident are innocent aggressors because they have acted voluntarily but have not culpably chosen 
to attack.   
                                                          
14 Jeff McMahan, “The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing,” 15 Phil. Issues 386 (2005). 
15 Jonathan Quong, “Liability to Defensive Harm,” 40 Phil. & Public Aff. 45 (2012). 
16 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 34-35. 
17 McMahan, “Basis of Moral Liability,” 393-94. 
18 McMahan, “Basis of Moral Liability,” 387. 
19 For some doubts about deeming the innocent threat as distinguishable from the innocent aggressor, see 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Jeffrie Murphy’s ‘Involuntary Acts and Criminal Liability’ Revisited”  forthcoming Ethics; 





I have defended the claim that none of these actors is liable to be killed as none of them are 
culpable.20  (I do maintain that with respect to non-culpable attackers, it is plausible that one has an 
agent-relative permission to give one’s own life greater weight vis-à-vis innocent aggressors.21)  In 
contrast, Jeff McMahan claims that anyone who (1) will in fact cause an unjustified harm (as is true in 
each of these cases because in each case, from an omniscient point of view, none of these actors is 
behaving justifiably) and (2) has engaged in foreseeable nonreciprocal risk imposition (as is true in the 
latter two cases because in those two cases the innocent aggressors know they are engaging in behavior 
that creates a risk of harming an innocent – the driver chooses to drive and the resident chooses to 
shoot) is liable because the aggressor is morally responsible.22  Jonathan Quong argues that only the 
Resident is liable because she makes a mistake as to the twin’s liability (she believes he is attacking her 
and has forfeited a right when in fact he has not) and it is the failure to accord someone his full moral 
status that makes the aggressor liable.23  In contrast, according to Quong, because the Conscientious 
Driver’s risk calculation already takes into account the value of both his life and that of the pedestrian 
(the determination that it is safe to drive conscientiously already includes in the calculation, and gives 
due value to, the possibility of harming a pedestrian), the driver is not liable.  Neither Quong nor 
McMahan maintains that the Falling Large Man is liable as he has not chosen to impose any risk at all. 
 Beyond liability itself, theorists must address proportionality and necessity.  Consider 
proportionality first.  Most theorists agree that the harm employed defensively must be in proportion to 
the harm threatened.24  One way to understand this is that the aggressor only forfeits rights against a 
certain amount of force.  Anything beyond that amount is a harm that would violate his rights.  
Proportionality then is typically seen as internal to liability.25 
There is more significant debate over the question of necessity.  Jeff McMahan, for example, 
crafts liability in such a way that it entails necessity.  An aggressor is only liable to harm if it is necessary 
to harm him to protect oneself.26  The reason that one acts, then, is built into the liability/forfeiture 
condition.  In contrast, one might claim that the loss of a right is independent of the reason to harm the 
aggressor.  The attack forfeits rights, and the attack provides a reason to harm the aggressor, but these 
                                                          
20 Ferzan, “Culpable Aggression.” 
21 Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, with Stephen J. Morse, Crime and Culpability:  A Theory of Criminal 
Law (New York: Cambridge, 2009), 136-41. 
22 McMahan, “Basis of Moral Liability.” 
23 Quong, “Liability to Defensive Harm.”  For doubts about Quong’s view, see Larry Alexander, “Recipe for a Theory 
of Self-Defense:  The Ingredients, and Some Cooking Suggestions” in Michael Weber and Christian Coons (eds.), 
The Ethics of Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford, forthcoming).  
24 But see Peter Vallentyne, “ Defense of Self and Others against Culpable Rights-Violators,” in Michael Weber and 
Christian Coons (eds.), The Ethics of Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford, forthcoming).  
25 This sort of proportionality is called “narrow proportionality,” a requirement that the harm to the aggressor be 
in proportion to what he has threatened.  In contrast, if the defender will also injure bystanders, this brings in 
questions of “wide proportionality.”  This sort of proportionality is not internal to liability.  It is the restriction that 
even if the aggressor has no rights against you harming him, the two innocent actors beside him, who will be killed 
as well, do have such rights and thereby restrict what you may do. 
26 Jeff McMahan, “The Limits of Self-Defense,” in Michael Weber and Christian Coons (eds.), The Ethics of Self-




two can come apart:  if, for example, the culpable attacker is only bluffing – his attack forfeits his right 
without providing a reason to harm him.27  Both views still require that the defender believe force is 
necessary, either because the intention is relevant to permissibility or because the rights forfeiture is 
nuanced so that rights are only forfeited vis-à-vis actors who believe the harm they are inflicting will 
prevent the attack.28 
A final consideration for liability accounts is the possibility of more than one aggressor or threat.  
What if, instead of a large man, Abe goes to the nearby hospital, takes 50 newborn babies, ties them 
together with twine, and hurls the bawl of babies at Victor?  What if, instead of one Conscientious 
Driver, Peter, the pedestrian, must kill fifteen individuals who have chosen to drive their cars? 
 I suspect that most people would think that it is wrong to kill the fifty babies or fifteen 
nonculpable drivers.  This gives us reason to reject the view that these threats/aggressors are liable to 
be killed.  This intuition is likely even stronger when we appeal to the question of what third parties 
should do.  Why would a third party have to pick Victor over fifty babies?  What is the argument for 
that? 
 Some theorists, who are sympathetic to the claim that innocent aggressors can be liable to 
defensive force, have offered alternative accounts for what to do when these “minimally responsible 
threats” are aggregated.  McMahan and Saba Bazargan advocate hybrid justifications that contain 
elements of liability and elements of a lesser-evils justification.29  The idea is that a conscientious driver 
may be partially liable.  The reason it is permissible to kill him, then, is because he counts as less of a 
person when weighed against the pedestrian.  Because this is a lesser-evils balancing, continuing to 
increase the number of conscientious drivers ultimately leads to a point at which the pedestrian may no 
longer kill the conscientious drivers because their deaths are no longer the lesser evil.  To be sure, 
increasing the number of aggressors raises puzzles for those who take innocent aggressors to be liable.  
Although these are clearly divergent views and this is a superficial overview, even now, we can 
see that these views share certain core assumptions.  The first is that individuals can forfeit rights by 
what they do, and that one can provide a principled account of why the individual is responsible in such 
a way that it is fitting and appropriate for his rights to be forfeited. The second is that this forfeiture can 
be nuanced.  It is not an assumption that we get to boil aggressors in oil for kicks.  It is an assumption 
that for so long as you are a threat, you cannot complain if someone stops you.  Thus, though self-
defense theorists might quibble over the grounds for rights-forfeiture, we share certain assumptions 
about what such a theory needs and what such a theory does. 
                                                          
27 Ferzan, “The Bluff.” 
28 I endorse the latter position in “Forfeiture and Self-Defense.” 
29 Saba Bazaragan, “The Liability of Minimally Responsible Threats,” forthcoming Ethics; Jeff McMahan, “Liability, 
Proportionality, and the Number of Aggressors,” in Saba Bazaragan and Samuel Rickless, (eds.), The Ethics of War 




  I cannot possibly do justice to the complexity of the arguments in the self-defense scholarship.  
If anyone could master the mechanics, it would be Michael Moore.  Any subject matter is the better for 
Moore’s engagement with it.  Where, then, should we situate Moore’s views on defensive force? 
 
II. Moore on Self-Defense 
 Moore typically substantially and thoroughly analyzes topics within criminal law.  Unfortunately, 
he has spent less of his career grappling with self-defense.  If I had to diagnose the cause of this lack of 
attention, it would not be that Moore is reluctant to confront a challenge.  Quite the contrary.  I suspect 
he thinks self-defense is easy.  Hopefully, I can convince him that this is not so.   
Moore’s most recent articulation of his position is in Targeted Killings and the Morality of Hard 
Choices.30  He begins with the claim that we have a “strong permission” to engage in self-defense such 
that we are permitted to defend ourselves even if the consequentialist balance tips otherwise.31   
Following Phillip Montague, he takes self-defense to be an instance of a “general moral principle”:  “he 
who culpably causes the necessity of some harm being visited on somebody, is himself the right person 
to be made to suffer such harm.”32  This principle is supported by “robust intuitions of fairness and 
appropriateness.”33  There is a “divine justice” when the bad guy gets the harm he had intended for the 
innocent victim.34 
 Moore then turns to innocent aggressors and threats.  In 2009, in Causation and Responsibility, 
Moore was tentative about his conclusion that one is justified in killing two innocent threats.35  In 
Targeted Killings, Moore no longer finds the question hard.  He admits the question is “a close one” but 
concludes that one is justified in killing innocent aggressors and threats, seemingly no matter how 
numerous.36  Ball o’ babies beware! 
 Moore rejects victim-based accounts that culpable actors may forfeit their rights, thus creating a 
weak permission that is then open to consequentialist balancing.37  He thus reaffirms a position he set 
forth in Placing Blame.  In his earlier discussion, Moore maintains that forfeiture accounts cannot supply 
a reason why innocent aggressors forfeit their rights nor can they provide an explanation for why when 
an attack is over, the aggressor regains his rights.38 
 In sum, Moore offers a distributive justice account of self-defense, wherein harm ought to fall 
upon its culpable cause.  He maintains this account is a strong permission, immune to consequentialist 
                                                          
30 Moore, 2012b. 
31 Moore, 2012b, 457.  
32 Moore, 2012b, 457.  
33 Moore, 2012b, 457.  
34 Moore, 2012b, 457.  
35 Moore, 2009d, 40. 
36 Moore, 2012b, 458. 
37 Moore, 2012b, 464. 




balancing.  He believes this permission also applies to Falling Large Man, Conscientious Driver, and The 
Resident, and he maintains that this position holds even when the innocent aggressors outnumber the 
defenders.  Finally, he rejects forfeiture accounts as implausible.  
 In what follows, I wish to question these claims.  First, it is unclear what grounds Moore’s 
extension from the redistribution of harm to its culpable cause, to the redistribution of harm to its 
innocent cause.  Moreover, I am unsure why a causal account would necessarily yield that defenders get 
to kill innocent threats; I would think that for Moore this would be empirically contingent on the degree 
of causal contribution.  Second, I worry that self-defense is not best understood as a mechanism of 
distributive justice as it ignores the aggressor’s ability to stop attacking thereby preventing the need for 
anyone to be harmed.  Third, I query whether Moore’s dismissal of forfeiture is warranted, both because 
forfeiture views rely on changes of normative relations, which in other contexts Moore takes to be quite 
possible, and because the sort of underlying moral justification at work in Moore’s theory seems in 
harmony with the claims made by forfeiture theorists.  Finally, I question whether Moore’s theory of 
self-defense might justify a deterrence-based criminal law.  Indeed, I wonder whether he might be 
committed to punishing the innocent. 
III. What Grounds Killing Innocent Aggressors? 
The first puzzle is how Moore grounds the extension of “divine justice” from culpable aggressors 
to innocent threats.  He asserts that for culpable aggressors, the reason why it is justifiable to kill them is 
that (1) culpable actors who (2) cause (3) the need for someone to be harmed are the ones who should 
therefore be harmed.  This is grounded in robust intuitions of fairness that bad guys get their due.  He 
then goes on to say that defenders can kill innocent threats as well. 
I don’t get it.  Nothing about the fittingness and appropriateness of culpable actors being 
harmed defensively seems to commit us to any particular view of innocent actors.   With respect to 
innocent aggressors, Moore abandons requirement (1).  He never fully articulates an argument for why 
it is permissible to kill Falling Large Man, Conscientious Driver, or The Resident.   
Without culpability, Moore is left with only causation and necessity.  Perhaps Moore thinks that 
is enough.39  However, as Coase has shown, causation is reciprocal.40  The only reason the large man 
falling down the well is a threat to the defender at the bottom is because the defender found himself at 
the bottom of a well.  Aren’t they both causes? 
Indeed, Moore believes that causation is scalar.  Is it not possible then that there will be cases in 
which the defender is more of the cause than the innocent threat?  After all, we imagine in these cases 
that Victor, the person at the bottom of the well, is somehow motivating Abe, the pusher, to try to kill 
him.  When Abe grabs the large man (who may just be on his way to the post office), why should we 
                                                          
39 He suggests as much in Moore, 1997b, 714. 




assume that the large man is more of a cause of the predicament than the defender?  Causation does 
not seem to be able to discriminate between innocent aggressor and defender as Moore would have it. 
If not culpability (or causation), then what makes this fitting?  It is hard to see this account as an 
account of distributive justice.  Should it not matter what the probability of being victim and defender 
are?  If we are interested in “fairness and appropriateness,” it seems the calculation should be sensitive 
to whether one is more likely to be victim or defender.  As Larry Alexander has argued, if it is much less 
likely that you will kill someone as an innocent aggressor than that you will become an innocent 
aggressor and be killed, perhaps we should not so easily decide that killing innocent aggressors is 
permissible.41    
There does not seem to be a moral principle that can be added to do the normative work.  
Besides the fact that, as Jimbo on South Park would say,42 “they’re coming right for us!” there does not 
seem to be any normative grounding that would undergird killing for such a reason.  At one point, 
Moore seems to indicate that “he’s coming right for us” is a moral ownership.  It is about “risk 
ownership.”  However, Moore has the ownership of the risk argument exactly backwards.  Consider 
what Moore says about innocent shields.  He imagines the following case: 
Consider the situation in which a terrorist (‘T’) takes an innocent bystander (‘V’) as a shield to 
use as T seeks to kill another (‘D’).  If D’s only way to defend himself against T is to shoot 
through V, it is common to suppose, morally and legally, that he may do so.  The reason for this, 
I would think, lies in the ‘ownership’ of the risk (of T’s violence) that V, through no fault of his 
own, has acquired.  T’s taking V as a shield was V’s misfortune; V did nothing to deserve it but 
it’s his nonetheless, like disease or natural catastrophe.  D is entitled to resist the shifting of that 
risk from V to himself, not because V caused the risk, but because it’s his risk nonetheless.43 
Why can it not be equally maintained that the person stuck owning the risk is D?  As it stands, V’s being 
strapped to T creates no risk to V whatsoever.  The unlucky person is D.  So why is it that D gets to shift 
the risk to V?  And why isn’t T entitled to resist the shifting of the risk?  If “shit happens”44 to the 
innocent who are then stuck with their misfortunes, it isn’t remotely clear why the person who is stuck 
is V and not D. 
Compare Jeff McMahan’s dismissal of this kind of reasoning in the falling man cases: 
It is, however, not the falling man who has bad luck.  If no one does anything, he will not be 
harmed, for there is a cushion below him.  It is that cushion, an immobilized person, who has 
bad luck.  May he transfer that bad luck to an innocent person, the falling man, by killing him?  
                                                          
41 Larry Alexander, “Self-Defense, Justification and Excuse,” 22 Phil. & Public Aff. 53 (1993). 
42 I’ve got my bad popular culture references too.  There is a great episode of South Park where Jimbo, a hunter, is 
told he may only kill animals who are attacking him.  The episode proceeds with innocent animals frolicking in the 
woods and Jimbo continuously asserting that “they’re coming right for us” so that he may shoot them. 
43 Moore, 1997b, 714. 




To override the presumption against killing, there must be a basis of liability.  That basis is 
lacking in this case, just as it is when a person can save himself only by killing an innocent 
bystander.45 
It seems that Moore has yet to come up with an argument that would decisively yield that defenders 
may kill innocent threats.46 
                I wonder what Moore believes he would lose by abandoning the strong permission approach in 
favor of an agent-relative permission to kill innocent aggressors.  Moore’s view on innocent aggressors is 
not in accord with that of Phillip Montague, upon whom Moore claims to be relying.  In Self-Defence and 
Innocence:  Aggressors and Active Threats, Montague distinguishes between culpable and innocent 
aggressors.47  Montague does not maintain that we have a claim right to kill innocent aggressors, 
holding instead that one has a liberty with which third parties may interfere.  This claim is in stark 
contrast with Moore’s robust position that self-defense against innocent aggressors is a strong 
permission. 
Moore has been sympathetic to agent-relative obligations in other work.  He notes, for example, 
that if an evil threatener threatens to kill a parent’s child unless the parent produces some greater evil, 
the parent is justified because the parent has an agent-relative obligation to safeguard her child.48  As 
mentioned earlier, some theorists do maintain that one has an agent-relative permission to give one’s 
own life greater weight.  Moore goes farther in other work, arguing that one has an agent-relative 
obligation to safeguard one’s child.  I wonder why Moore resists the agent-relative route.  There must 
be something more at work for Moore that allows defenders to kill many innocent people.  I wish he 
would, as the Pink Ladies and the T-Birds request, “tell me more.”  
  
IV. Is It Most Perspicuous to See Self-defense as Mechanism for the Distribution of Inevitable 
Harm? 
More generally, I doubt that seeing self-defense as a mechanism for the distribution of 
inevitable harm is the most perspicuous way to see it.49  As David Wasserman points out, unlike true 
distributive questions (in which someone’s gotta die), in self-defense cases, no one has to die.50  The 
                                                          
45 Jeff McMahan, “Reply,” in Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey, and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan (eds.), Criminal Law 
Conversations (New York: Oxford, 2009), 404-405. 
46  The most famous defender of the permissibility of killing the falling large man is Judith Thomson.  Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, “Self-Defense,”20 Phil.& Public Aff. 283 (1991).  For critiques, see Alexander, “Self-Defense, Justification 
and Excuse”; McMahan, “Basis of Moral Liability”; Ferzan, “Culpable Aggression.” 
47 12 Utilitas 62 (2000). 
48 Moore, 2014d. He also mentions the possibility of “skewing” in Moore, 2012b, 463. 
49 Admittedly, I was tempted by this view in earlier work.  See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” 24 
Law & Phil. 711 (2005).  But I have come to see that the grounding of the forfeiture is what does the heavy lifting. 




culpable aggressor could just change his mind, and he certainly has it within his power to eliminate the 
existence of any distributive problem.  
Indeed, Montague’s solution to this problem is one Moore would most certainly reject.  
Montague makes the necessity dependent on the agent’s perspective.  After assuming that Alice is 
attacking Al, and Arliss is a third party who can intervene, Montague says of Al and Arliss:  “They are 
respectively permitted and required to do so as a matter of justice in the distribution of harms that are 
unavoidable from their standpoints.”51  To Moore, justice isn’t a matter of perspective.  Moore would 
thus need to take the position that because it is necessary in fact (because the culpable aggressor will 
pull the trigger), the defender may act now to distribute a harm.  But taking this approach seemingly 
ignores that self-defense is preemptive and there is something important about the fact that the 
culpable aggressor can still prevent the creation of any harm.      
Moreover, as Wasserman also notes, once the harm is already out there and we are truly 
distributing it (for instance, the culpable aggressor has already sunk the ship and everyone is scrambling 
for planks), then lots of factors may count.52  Provocateurs nicely raise this.  Assume that Iago provokes 
Othello into trying to kill Desdemona, but this is a modern version where Othello sets up a machine gun 
to fire where Desdemona is sleeping.  Iago and Othello are both waiting in the wings.  All that you, a 
third party, can do is to push either Iago or Othello into the line of fire.  Who gets the bullet?  And, now, 
add another character in the wings -- Claudius, who, from another play, is already responsible for at 
least one death.  He is a bad guy who has not gotten the punishment he deserves.  How do we factor 
him into the mix if we are distributing this harm?  There are degrees of culpability, degrees of causal 
responsibility, and degrees of moral desert and who takes the bullet might just be complicated.53  I 
certainly do not disagree that in this sort of case, one must distribute the certain harm.  I merely think 
that such distributions are complex beyond Moore’s simple justice.   At most it seems that a distributive 
                                                          
51 Phillip Montague, “Self-Defense, Culpability, and Distributive Justice,” 29 Law and Phil. 75 (2009), 84 (emphasis 
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52 Phillip Montague, “Self-Defense and Choosing Between Lives,” 40 Phil. Studies 207, 211 (1981) (arguing that in 
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53 For the argument that it is Iago, see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Provocateurs,” 7 Crim. L. and Phil. 597 (2013).  For 
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therefore inapplicable to cases in which the victims of aggression are to some extent blameworthy for their 





justice account may explain some instances of self-defense some of the time.54  That’s fine in the sense 
that we need not have only one account.  However, Moore must then concede that more work must be 
done to cover other cases. 
V. Why Isn’t Moore a Fan of Forfeiture? 
Moore dismisses forfeiture theories as implausible.  I demur.  Moore needs forfeiture. 
It may be that Moore dismisses the “full surrender” robust forfeiture that we think of with 
respect to some legal rights.  Here, he is surely right.  If you give something up for ever and ever, well, 
then you don’t get it back just by lowering your gun.  I take the real objection here to be, not that these 
things are restored, but rather, whether this “now you have it, now you don’t, now you have it again” 
process is best viewed as one of forfeiture.  As Richard Lippke argues in the punishment context, 
“Offenders might be understood to suffer other losses with regard to their rights besides forfeiture.  
Specifically, their rights might be curtailed or suspended, instead of forfeited.  Forfeiture theorists need 
to show forfeiture, rather than curtailment or suspension, is the best characterization of the losses that 
are justifiably imposed on offenders.”55 
Elsewhere I have speculated that because forfeiture seems so final, the literature has gravitated 
toward “liability.” However, because “liability” in the self-defense literature is neither legal liability nor 
Hohfeldian liability, I am skeptical that this terminological shift was actually for the better.  
Nevertheless, even if the objection goes beyond nomenclature to a claim that there is something deeper 
at stake with respect to getting the shift in normative relations right, that still does not mean that 
offhanded dismissal of forfeiture is warranted.  Rather, what liability theorists claim is that there is a 
shift in the aggressor’s rights. 
Certainly, there is nothing odd about thinking that we can shift our rights and others’ duties.  I 
can change my moral relationship with you by giving you permission to drive my car.  I can obligate 
myself through making a promise.  I can give you a new reason for acting by making a request.  Why isn’t 
it plausible that self-defense likewise involves such a shifting of moral relations? 
Indeed, as a retributivist, Moore certainly needs an account of how it becomes the case that it is 
permissible to harm someone because she deserves it.  Either our rights are specified such that they are 
not infringed when we are given deserved punishment,56 or we forfeit our rights in such cases.57  Indeed, 
Moore allows of such a possibility, noting that we can punish offenders because no non-forfeited right 
stands in the state’s way, “since [offenders] forfeit such rights precisely by the culpable wrongdoing that 
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constitute desert.”58  If Moore does not deny that defendants may be permissibly punished—that is 
harmed without their rights standing in the punisher’s way—then why does he deny that rights may 
shift in self-defense cases?59 
Finally, one wonders whether Moore implicitly brings to bear the very same moral facts, just in a 
different package.  If self-defense is about distributing harm, there is a reason why the bad guy gets that 
harm and the good guy does not.60  That reason, that alteration in moral standing vis-à-vis others, looks 
quite like what liability theorists are after.  Perhaps Moore has good arguments for why these accounts 
are importantly different.  I wish he would tell us what those are.   
VI. A Deterrence Theorist After All? 
 To this point I have offered concerns about Moore’s commitments within self-defense theory, 
but if Moore is right, I wonder whether his theory of self-defense leads to a very different justification 
for punishment.  Notably, I share with Moore a commitment to retributivism.  I just wonder whether he 
is actually a back door deterrence theorist.  Here is how the argument runs. 
 The concern with deterrence theories of punishment is that they countenance punishing the 
innocent, and in particular, using the innocent as a means.  A pure utilitarian theory would allow good 
consequences to justify scapegoating someone wholly unconnected with the crime.61  Because 
utilitarian theories condone the punishment of the undeserving, and because mixed theories seem to 
exempt the punishment of the deserving where no further good is accomplished, Moore declares that 
the last theory standing is retributivism.  This is what he calls retributivism by the back door.62   
 The question, though, is whether Moore’s commitments to a distributive justice view of self-
defense can go some distance toward establishing a distinct justification for punishment.  Maybe there 
is more than one back door to the house.   
 Notice that the first chink in the armor, as Victor Tadros has shown, is that the prohibition on 
punishing, or using, the innocent, requires a deontological account of why harming this particular 
person is not using him.63  Retributivism furnishes such a reason, but Tadros has argued that if the 
wrongdoer has a duty to suffer then he is not being used.  If I push you into the lake, I have a duty to 
rescue you.  If Alex points a gun at me to enforce that duty, he is not using me as I am already required 
to rescue you from drowning.  The duty provides all the justification we need for why I am not being 
used as a means when Alex forces me to save you.  Now, one need not agree with Tadros about his duty 
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view for the criminal law (I doubt Moore does, and I don’t) to see the force of the argument, which is 
that a deontological account need not be a retributive account.  One just needs an account of why the 
person does not have a right that stands in the way. 
 Now consider Moore’s commitments to self-defense as a form of distributive justice.  If one is 
culpable in forcing a choice, then one ought to be the one to suffer the harm.  The culpable cause of the 
peril is the person who should suffer the harm.  Here, too, we have a deontological account of when it is 
permissible to harm others.   
In reaching this theory, Moore endorses Philip Montague’s work.  Let us consider another 
Montague fan.  Daniel Farrell also endorses Montague’s views, but for an entirely different end.  He 
employs Montague’s theory to justify specific and general deterrence.64 
 Farrell’s brief for specific deterrence is a rather clear case.  If someone hurts you, and by virtue 
of that attack, she makes it more likely that you will not be able to resist subsequent attacks from her, 
then she is the culpable cause of your peril.  If harming her abates these potential injuries, then on 
Montague’s theory, claims Farrell, one is justified in harming the attacker.65 
 Consider also his claim for general deterrence.  “[S]omeone might attack me, in the state of 
nature, and someone else, observing this attack, and observing as well that it goes unpunished, might be 
inspired by what she sees to attack me subsequently herself, even though she would not have dared to 
do this if my original attacker had been punished for his attack.”66  Now, admittedly, there are some 
steps required to get from this point to a system of general deterrence.  Farrell endorses the view that 
one is harmed when one is faced with an “increased probability of being harmed sometime in the 
future.”67  Moore would never go for that.  He does not take risks to be harms.  Still, Moore cannot avoid 
the point that given his endorsement of Montague’s theory, on self-defense and defense of others 
grounds, we may be justified in harming someone if he makes an attack by others inevitable. 
 It may be that such a theory is too convoluted for application in the real world.  It may simply be 
impossible to determine how much harm may be visited on a defendant for the peril he creates in the 
future.68  Perhaps, via this reasoning, deterrence may be theoretically justified but not practically 
implemented. 
 Still, I am somewhat curious what would happen in the (nearby?) possible world where Moore 
pursues these questions with the same sort of ruthless resolve with which he has subjected action 
theory or causal metaphysics.  Would Moore endorse the position that his distributive justice 
commitments yield an entirely different justification for punishment?   
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Indeed, consider what the content of our criminal law would look like if Moore took his theory 
of self-defense and maintained his view that it applies to innocent threats.  Consider cases of 
nondeserving actors in the retributive sense.  Sometimes utilitarian arguments are made that an excuse 
should not be recognized because recognition will open up the floodgates to abuse by others.  Mistake 
of law, duress, and insanity are classic instances where such a claim arises.  This sort of argument is 
antithetical to retributivism, but it isn’t to Moore’s distributive justice account of self-defense.  If your 
innocent mistake makes me vulnerable to ploys by nonmistaken actors, you have made me worse off, 
and thus, you ought to be the one to suffer the harm.  Punishment of the (morally) innocent is justified 
after all.  I suppose that in Moore’s book, they just own that risk they’ve done nothing to deserve. 
Conclusion 
Michael Moore does not just engage topics.  He conquers them.  I have learned more from him than any 
other theorist.  I am grateful to have had him as a teacher.  I am grateful to call him my friend.  But most 
importantly, I am grateful that such a brilliant mind has done such tremendous work in a field I love, and 
that I get to engage with his ideas.  Now, Michael, please come and conquer self-defense.   
 
